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Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal
jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you
are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan
(forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists
have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a
automatic feature binding mechanism (see Pourtois et al., 2000; Vatakis and Spence, 2007;
Navarra et al., 2012). I present new evidence against this. I argue that there is no automatic
feature binding mechanism that couples features like the jolt and the clang together.
Instead, when you experience the jolt and the clang as part of the same event, this is the
result of an associative learning process.The cymbal’s jolt and the clang are best understood
as a single learned perceptual unit, rather than as automatically bound. I outline the speciﬁc
learning process in perception called “unitization,” whereby we come to “chunk” the world
into multimodal units. Unitization has never before been applied to multimodal cases. Yet
I argue that this learning process can do the same work that intermodal binding would
do, and that this issue has important philosophical implications. Speciﬁcally, whether we
take multimodal cases to involve a binding mechanism or an associative process will have
impact on philosophical issues from Molyneux’s question to the question of how active or
passive we consider perception to be.
Keywords: perceptual learning, crossmodal integration, feature binding, multimodal interaction, crossmodal
interaction, binding, multisensory integration, associative learning
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a
solo. You see the cymbal jolt and youhear the clang. But in addition
seeing the cymbal jolt andhearing the clang, you are also aware that
the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. CaseyO’Callaghan
(forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding
awareness.” It is intermodal, meaning that it involves more than
one sense modality. It is feature binding in that the features are
perceived as jointly bound to the same object or event. And it is
awareness, because you are conscious of the features being bound
to the object or event in this way.
While I agree that we can have awareness that the jolt and the
clang are part of the same event, I will argue that there is no
automatic feature binding mechanism that binds features like the
jolt and the clang together. Instead, when you experience the jolt
and the clang as part of the same event, this is the result of an
associative learning process. The cymbal’s jolt and the clang are
best understood as a single learned perceptual unit, rather than as
automatically bound. More generally,my claim is that multimodal
cases involve learned associations, and I will outline a speciﬁc
learning process in perception whereby we come to “chunk” the
world into multimodal units. A central contribution of the paper
is this: unitization is an entirely undiscussed way that an associ-
ationist might implement an associative account of multimodal
perception. It is one thing to say that features x and y are asso-
ciated. It is another thing to give a detailed account (drawing on
an established perceptual learning process) of how exactly that
association happens. In what follows, I attempt to do exactly that.
It can be difﬁcult to tease apart the difference between an
account of multimodal perception based on intermodal feature
binding and an account based on associative learning. For now,
the key question to ask is how features, such as a jolt and a clang,
come to be coupled. Speciﬁcally, did the coupling happen in past
experience, or did it happen just prior to your current experience?
In other words, if you experience a jolt and a clang as part of the
same event, is this due to those features getting coupled in your
past experience, or did the coupling of the jolt and the clang occur
just prior to your experience of them?
If feature binding awareness does not involve feature binding—
which is what I will argue—then this ﬂies in the face of the
way that scientists working on multimodal perception have
been thinking about these cases. Consider four such repre-
sentative passages highlighted by O’Callaghan(forthcoming, ms
pp. 8–9):
When presented with two stimuli, one auditory and the other visual,
an observer can perceive them either as referring to the same unitary
audiovisual event or as referring to two separate unimodal events ....
There appear to be speciﬁc mechanisms in the human perceptual system
involved in the binding of spatially and temporally aligned sensory stimuli.
(Vatakis and Spence, 2007, 744, 754, italics were added for emphasis).
As an example of such privileged binding, we will examine the relation
between visible impacts and percussive sounds, which allows for a
particularly powerful form of binding that produces audio-visual objects.
(Kubovy and Schutz, 2010, 42, italics were added for emphasis).
In a natural habitat information is acquired continuously and simulta-
neously through the different sensory systems. As some of these inputs
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have the same distal source (such as the sight of a ﬁre, but also the
smell of smoke and the sensation of heat) it is reasonable to suppose
that the organism should be able to bundle or bind information across
sensory modalities and not only just within sensory modalities. For
one such area where intermodal binding (IB) seems important, that of
concurrently seeing and hearing affect, behavioural studies have shown
that indeed intermodal binding takes place during perception. (Pourtois
et al., 2000, 1329, italics were added for emphasis).
[T]here is undeniable evidence that the visual and auditory aspects
of speech, when available, contribute to an integrated perception of
spoken language .... The binding of AV speech streams seems to be, in fact,
so strong that we are less sensitive to AV asynchrony when perceiving
speech than when perceiving other stimuli (Navarra et al., 2012, 447,
italics were added for emphasis)1.
The traditional view is that multimodal perception at the
conscious-level is the result of intermodal feature binding at the
unconscious-level in all the ways mentioned above, whether it is
with spatially and temporally aligned stimuli, audio-visual objects,
with facial expression and tone of voice, or audio-visual speech
streams. I will argue that this view is mistaken.
Whether multimodal perception involves an automatic bind-
ing process or an associative process has been discussed before
(in the case of speech perception, for instance, see Altieri and
Townsend, 2011; Altieri et al., 2011). Starting with the former
view, the theory that multimodal perception involves an auto-
matic binding process is consistent with several other theories
in the psychological literature on perception, including Gibson’s
(1950, 1972, 1979) theory of direct perception and Fowler’s dis-
cussion of speech as an amodal phenomenon (Fowler, 2004). On
Gibson’s view, for instance, we directly perceive objects with their
features already integrated. We do not have to associate the jolt
and the clang, for instance, because we directly perceive the cym-
bal, and the jolt and clang features are already integrated into the
cymbal. Similarly, Fowler (2004) discusses the view that listeners
directly perceive speech gestures. A gestural percept is amodal, as
she describes it, with information from different sense modali-
ties already integrated into it. On this view, you perceive a speech
gesture with the auditory and visual features already integrated
into it.
What Gibson, Fowler, and the binding view have in common is
that features are automatically bound outside of and prior to con-
scious perception. Since processing happens early, a good model
is a coactive model, which Townsend and Nozawa (1995) deﬁne
as, “A parallel architecture which assumes that input from the
separate parallel channels is consolidated into a resultant com-
mon processor” (p. 323). The binding mechanism, in this case,
would serve as the common processor that consolidates infor-
mation channels from different sense modalities. On a coactive
model, the jolt and the clang information would be consolidated
into the binding mechanism, and the output of that mechanism
results in those bound features being available to consciousness.
This enables awareness that the features are part of the same event
(see Figure 1).
The view that multimodal perception results from an associa-
tive learning process, on the other hand, is consistent with several
1O’Callaghan adds to this list: Bushara et al. (2003), Bertelson and de Gelder (2004),
Spence and Driver (2004), Spence (2007), and Stein (2012).
FIGURE 1 | Multimodal perception as an automatic binding process.
other theories in the psychological literature on perception. Smith
and Yu (2007, 2008), for example, have studied how both infants
and adults match words to scenes. As Quine (1960) pointed out,
given a somewhat complex scene, for any given word, there are
an inﬁnite number of possible referents. Yet, Smith and Yu (2007,
2008) and Yu and Smith (2006, 2007, 2011, 2012) show how the
binding of a word and a referent occurs through an associative
learning process whereby infants and adults learn, across varying
contexts, the statistical likelihood that a word refers to a particular
kind of object). Along the same lines, Wallace (2004) describes
how multisensory neurons require a protracted maturation pro-
cess. Speciﬁcally, multisensory neurons get strengthened through
experience.
What holds the theories of Smith and Yu, Wallace, and myself
in common is that on our views features are not coupled by an
automatic mechanism, but rather get coupled through an associa-
tive learning process. While associative accounts have been offered
for speech perception, as Smith and Yu do, they have rarely been
applied to multimodal cases outside of speech perception, and this
paper shows how they can be applied in that way. A goodmodel for
associative learning is an interactive parallel processing model (see
Townsend and Wenger, 2004). According to this model, the infor-
mation channels from different sense modalities are processed in
parallel, but can interact. The jolt and the clang information, for
instance, involve parallel processing, and the interaction between
the two information streams enables them to become associated.
The result of this association is that the jolt and the clang are later
experienced, not as distinct, but as part of one and the same event
(see Figure 2)2.
My plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In section “Why
is the Debate Signiﬁcant?” I will say why it is signiﬁcant whether
we take multimodal cases to involve a binding mechanism or an
associative process at the unconscious-level. In particular, it will
have impact on philosophical issues from Molyneux’s question to
the question of how active or passive we should consider percep-
tion to be. In section “Intermodal Feature Binding Awareness,”
I will brieﬂy explain O’Callaghan’s notion of intermodal feature
binding awareness—an account that details what is happening at
2Thanks to a reviewer for extensive suggestions about related literature, and the
connections between that literature and the claims I make in the paper.
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FIGURE 2 | Multimodal perception as an associative learning process.
the conscious-level for cases that many psychologists have taken
to involve intermodal feature binding at the unconscious-level.
In section “Unitization,” I will offer a previously undiscussed
alternative to intermodal feature binding—what’s called “unitiza-
tion” in the literature on perceptual learning. In section “Applying
Unitization to Multimodal Cases,” I will apply unitization to
multimodal cases, and show how the phenomenon is consistent
with O’Callaghan’s main argument for intermodal feature binding
awareness. In section “Objections and Responses,” I will respond
to some objections.
WHY IS THE DEBATE SIGNIFICANT?
Why does it matter whether intermodal feature binding aware-
ness is the result of intermodal binding or of learned associations?
One reason has to do with the implications the issue has for a
long-standing philosophical problem. Molyneux’s question asks
whether a man born blind, who can distinguish a cube and sphere
by touch, could distinguish those shapes upon having his sight
restored. If intermodal feature binding awareness is the result of
learned associations, then we have a straightforward “no” answer
to Molyneux’s question. You see the cube for the ﬁrst time. No
learned associations have taken place between sight and touch. So,
no, you don’t recognize which is the cube and which is the sphere
(see Table 1).
How we answer Molyneux’s question will, in turn, have ramiﬁ-
cations for debates between nativists or rationalists such as Leibniz
(1765/1982), on the one hand, and empiricists such as Locke
(1690/1975) on the other hand. On Molyneux’s question, nativists
hold that the association between the felt and seen cube is innate,
while empiricists hold that it is learned. If the association between
the felt and seen cube is learned, therefore yielding a “no” answer
to Molyneux’s question, then this gives us an empiricist answer to
Molyneux’s question, rather than a nativist one.
Recent experimental evidence lends support to the claim that
the answer to Molyneux’s question is a “no.” A study con-
ducted by Held et al. (2011) tested whether subjects who had
just undergone cataract removal surgery for sight restoration,
would be able to identify previously felt legos by sight. In the
study, subjects ﬁrst were given one lego to touch. Next, they
were visually presented with two distinctly shaped legos, and
were asked which of the two legos they had previously been
touching. Subjects performed at near-chance levels in answer-
ing this question. Held and colleagues interpret this result to
mean that the answer to Molyneux’s question is likely to be
“no,” since subjects born blind, who could distinguish between
shapes by touch, could not distinguish those shapes upon hav-
ing their sight restored (for a debate about the experimental
design in Held et al., 2011; see Schwenkler, 2012, 2013; Connolly,
2013).
A second reason it matters whether intermodal feature bind-
ing awareness is the result of intermodal binding or of learned
associations is that, as O’Callaghan has pointed out, one of the
most important discoveries in the cognitive science of percep-
tion in the past two decades is that the senses involve extensive
interaction and coordination. We want to understand how this
works, and many cases of multisensory awareness are cases of
binding awareness. But are cases of binding awareness the result
of intermodal binding, or are they the result of learned asso-
ciations? Depending on which one of these is our answer, we
will have a different account of one of the most important dis-
coveries in the cognitive science of perception in the past two
decades.
A third reason the debate is important is that a view that
makes multimodal perception a ﬂexible, learned process (see, for
instance, Connolly, 2014) ﬁts more naturally with the emerg-
ing view of perception as a more active process than it has
typically been taken to be. That is to say, it ﬁts with a view
of perception where the perceiver works to construct the world
through learning and exploration rather than just passively receiv-
ing inputs that get transformed into a representation of the
world. On an active view the perceiver does not simply look
at the world as a passive observer, but has to look around,
explore, and tweak the processes that are involved in percep-
tion to make them more useful to them for knowing what is
out in the world, and for interacting with the world in an
effective way.
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Table 1 | Multimodal perception: associative learning vs. intermodal
feature binding.
Associative
learning
Intermodal feature
binding
When does the coupling
happen?
In past experience Jut prior to present
experience
Can the theory
accommodate intermodal
feature binding awareness?
Yes (see “Applying
Unitization to
Multimodal Cases”)
Yes
How does the theory answer
Molyneux’s question?
Deﬁnitive “No” Likely “Yes”
What kind of processing
model ﬁts theTheory?
Interactive parallel
processing model
Coactive model
INTERMODAL FEATURE BINDING AWARENESS
When you are listening to the drum solo, see the cymbal jolt, hear
the clang, and are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part
of the same event, this is a case of intermodal feature binding
awareness. Why is intermodal feature binding awareness of the-
oretical signiﬁcance? One reason is that it propels an argument,
made by O’Callaghan (2014), that not all perceptual experience is
modality speciﬁc, that is to say, that there are cases of multimodal
perceptionwhich cannot be broken down into just seeing, hearing,
touching, tasting, and smelling, happening at the same time. As he
puts it, perceptual awareness is not just “minimally multimodal.”
It is not just exhausted by perceptual awareness in each of the sense
modalities happening at the same time.
Why does O’Callaghan deny minimal multimodality? One rea-
son is due to intermodal feature binding awareness. Intermodal
feature binding awareness occurs when you consciously perceive
multiple features from more than one sense modality jointly to
belong to the same object or event. O’Callaghan’s main argument
for intermodal feature binding awareness runs as follows. Con-
sider the difference between the following cases one and two. In
case one, when the drummer begins a solo, you see the cymbal
jolt and hear the clang, and you are aware that the jolt and the
clang are part of the same event. In case two, you see the jolt and
hear the clang, but you are not aware that the jolt and the clang
are part of the same event. Perhaps you have never seen a cym-
bal before and are unaware of the sound that it makes. According
to O’Callaghan, there may be a phenomenal difference between
case one and case two. This difference is explicable in terms of
intermodal feature binding awareness: case one involves such an
awareness, while case two does not. O’Callaghan generalizes the
point: “a perceptual experience as of something’s being F and G
may differ in phenomenal character from an otherwise equivalent
perceptual experience as of something F and something G, where
F and G are features perceptually experienced through different
modalities” (O’Callaghan, 2014, ms p. 8). This is just to say that
in the cymbal example and others like it, case one differs from
case two in terms of its phenomenology. O’Callaghan explains
this difference in that the former, but not the latter case involves
intermodal feature binding awareness.
Everything said so far is about feature binding awareness. This is
something that happens at the conscious-level. But psychologists
often talk about feature binding, and there they are referring to a
unconscious process. As a representative view, Vatakis and Spence
claim:
When presented with two stimuli, one auditory and the other visual,
an observer can perceive them either as referring to the same unitary
audiovisual event or as referring to two separate unimodal events ....
There appear to be speciﬁc mechanisms in the human perceptual system
involved in the binding of spatially and temporally aligned sensory stimuli.
(Vatakis and Spence, 2007, 744, 754; quoted by O’Callaghan, 2014, ms
p. 8)
But what is the connection between feature binding awareness
and the feature binding process? The assumption in the empirical
literature is that cases like the cymbal case depend upon feature
binding at the unconscious-level—an assumption that I will argue
is mistaken. Roughly and brieﬂy, on my view, cases like the cym-
bal case are best explained through a process called “unitization,”
whereby features (such as the jolt and the clang) that were once
detected separately, are later detected as a single unit. For exam-
ple, while someone who has never seen a cymbal before might
plausibly experience the clash and the jolt not as the part of the
same event, others unitize those features into the same event, due
to learning.
O’Callaghan’s own argument is about feature binding aware-
ness, which he describes as likely related to—but not the same
as—feature binding itself. O’Callaghan explains the connection:
“Feature binding awareness presumably depends upon feature
binding processes. I say “presumably” because a feature binding
process ... may require that features are detected or analyzed sep-
arately by subpersonal perceptual mechanisms” (forthcoming, ms
p. 3). At the same time, O’Callaghan distances himself from fea-
ture binding processes. He allows that “it is possible that what I
have characterized as feature binding awareness could occur with-
out such a feature binding process” (forthcoming, ms p. 3). So,
on O’Callaghan’s view, the existence of feature binding awareness
does not imply a feature binding process.
O’Callaghan’s account of feature binding awareness is consis-
tent with my view, since I deny a feature binding process, and
his view does not imply such a process. But one place where
O’Callaghan and I differ is with the name “feature binding aware-
ness.” If there is an associative process involved rather than a
feature bindingmechanismand the result of the associative process
manifests itself at the conscious-level (and I will argue that this is
the case), it is hard to see why we should call the conscious upshot
“feature binding awareness” rather than “associative awareness.”
If there is an associative process, then since we will have ruled
out a feature binding mechanism in favor of a different process, it
would be inaccurate to call the conscious upshot “feature binding
awareness.3”
At the same time,O’Callaghan and I are united in our departure
from Spence and Bayne (2014), who say the following:
But are features belonging to different modalities bound together in
the form of MPOs [multimodal perceptual objects]? ... [W]e think it
3I thank Casey O’Callaghan and Diana Raffman for clarifying the relationship
between O’Callaghan’s position and my own.
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is debatable whether the “unity of the event” really is internal to one’s
experience in these cases, or whether it involves a certain amount of
post-perceptual processing (or inference). In other words, it seems to
us to be an open question whether, in these situations, one’s experience
is of a MPO or whether instead it is structured in terms of multiple
instances of unimodal perceptual objects. (Spence and Bayne, 2014,ms
27, 29; quoted by O’Callaghan, forthcoming, p. 5)
On Spence and Bayne’s account, it is debatable whether inter-
modal feature binding awareness occurs at all. So, in the cymbal
case, where O’Callaghan and I think that you can see the cymbal
jolt and hear the clang, and be aware that the jolt and the clang are
part of the same event, Spence and Bayne think that is debatable.
One alternative, they might say, is that you see the jolt of the cym-
bal, hear the clang, and infer that they are both associated with
the same object. And on their view, it is an open question whether
such an alternative is correct.
O’Callaghan’s account is restricted to the conscious-level. But
we can ask what the unconscious processes are which produce it.
Psychologists have assumed that intermodal feature binding pro-
duces multimodal perception, but I will now explore a previously
undiscussed alternative to intermodal feature binding—what is
called “unitization” in the literature on perceptual learning.
UNITIZATION
Robert Goldstone, one of the leading psychologists working on
perceptual learning today, lists unitization as one of four mecha-
nisms of perceptual learning. What is perceptual learning? Eleanor
Gibson deﬁnes it as “any relatively permanent and consistent
change in the perception of a stimulus array, following practice
or experience with this array” (Gibson, 1963, p. 29). Perceptual
learning involves perceptual changes. Perceptual changes occur so
that we can better perform the cognitive tasks that we need to do.
The idea is that to ideally perform cognitive tasks, it is better for
perceptual systems to be ﬂexible, rather than hardwired. As Gold-
stone puts it, one might be tempted to hold that the perceptual
system is hardwired, the intuition being that “stable foundations
make strong foundations” (Goldstone, 2010, p. v). But actually
a better model of perception is a suspension bridge: “Just as a
suspension bridge provides better support for cars by conform-
ing to the weight loads, perception supports problem solving and
reasoning by conforming to these tasks” (Goldstone, 2010, p. v).
Perceptual systems are ﬂexible rather than hardwired so that they
can better support cognitive tasks. Speciﬁcally, the kind of ﬂex-
ibility on which I will focus is how perceptual systems are able
to construct perceptual units of the various different sizes, which
improve our ability to respond to our environment.
When people hear about perceptual learning, they often think
of cases of improved discrimination abilities. William James, for
instance, writes of a man who has learned to distinguish by taste
between the upper and lower half of a particular type of wine
(James, 1890, p. 509). What the man’s perceptual system had pre-
viously treated as a single thing is later treated as two distinct
things. Psychologists who work on perceptual learning call this
differentiation. But the converse happens as well. Sometimes, what
has been treated previously by the perceptual system as two things,
is later treated by it as one thing. Psychologists call this unitization.
Perceptual units are created not just by breaking down larger units
(like the bottle of wine) into smaller one’s (like the top half and the
bottom half), but also by merging smaller units into larger ones.
As Goldstone puts it, “Unitization involves the construction of
single functional units that can be triggered when a complex con-
ﬁguration arises. Via unitization, a task that originally required
detection of several parts can be accomplished by detecting a
single unit .... [U]nitization integrates parts into single wholes”
(Goldstone, 1998, p. 602)4. For example, consider someone who
is developing an expertise in wine tasting and is learning to detect
Beaujolais. Detecting it at ﬁrst might involve detecting several fea-
tures, such as the sweetness, tartness, and texture. But detecting
the Beaujolais is later accomplished by just detecting it as a single
unit. Since the Beaujolais gets unitized by your perceptual system,
this allows you to quickly and accurately recognize it, when you
taste it.
According to Goldstone and Byrge, unitization in perception is
akin to “chunking” in memory (Goldstone and Byrge, 2014, ms p.
15). Normally, we are only able to commit 7±2 items into short-
term memory. Yet, we are easily able to do much better with the
following string of 27 letters, by chunking them:
M O N T U E W E D F B I C I A K G B C B S N B C A B C
We can chunk the ﬁrst nine letters as abbreviations for days
of the week, the next nine as abbreviations for intelligence agen-
cies, and the ﬁnal nine as abbreviations for American television
networks. Chunking is the building of new units that help to
enable memory. Similarly, in perception, unitization allows us to
encode complex information, which without unitizationwemight
be unable to encode. Suppose, for instance, that you are drinking
an extremely complex Beaujolais that you have never tasted before.
Your perceptual system might unitize that type of wine, allowing
you to recognize it, despite the fact that it is extremely complex.
A whole host of objects have been shown to be ﬁrst processed
as distinct parts, and later processed as a unit. Goldstone and
Byrge offer the following diverse list: “birds, words, grids of lines,
randomwire structures, ﬁngerprints, artiﬁcial blobs, and3-Dcrea-
tures made from simple geometric components” (Goldstone and
Byrge, 2014, ms p. 17). Unitization occurs not just for things
like cats and cars, but also for objects constructed in the lab. For
instance, Gauthier and Tarr (1997) constructed a set of objects
called “Greebles,” which shared a set of spatial features in com-
mon. When the subjects were exposed to the Greebles for long
enough, they would begin to process them as units (Gauthier and
Tarr, 1997). This showed up in the fact that people trained with
the Greebles performed better than novices on speed and accuracy
tests.
Many of the cases mentioned so far involve parts being treated
as wholes after unitization, as when parts of a Greeble get treated
as a whole unit. However, there are also cases in which attributes
or properties become treated as units. For instance, a study by
Shiffrin and Lightfoot (1997) showed that subjects are able to
unitize the angular properties (i.e., horizontality, verticality, or
diagonality) of a set of line segments. The study involved sets of
three line segments, each of the segments angled either horizon-
tally, vertically, or diagonally. Subjects were given a target set. Say,
4I will be drawing very closely from Goldstone (1998, pp. 602–604) and Goldstone
and Byrge (2014) in explaining unitization.
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for instance, that the target set is a set of two horizontal and one
vertical line segments. Given that target, the subjects were asked
to pick matching targets out (that is, all and only sets involv-
ing two horizontal and one vertical line segment), and ignore
distractors (such as a set of two vertical and one horizontal line seg-
ments, or three horizontal line segments, among others). Subjects
became very quick at this task through training, indicating that
they had unitized the angular attributes of each of the three line
segments.
As objects become unitized, the whole becomes easier to pro-
cess perceptually than the part. At ﬁrst, when one is learning what
Greebles are, it is essential to identify them by their features. After
they becomeunitized, however, it is easier to process themaswhole
units. Similarly, faces are unitized—they are easier to process as
wholes than as parts. One interesting feature of face unitization is
that inverting a face disrupts the unitization process. This means
that faces are harder to recognize when presented upside-down
than when presented right-side up (Diamond and Carey, 1986).
Furthermore, if you distort features of a face, the distortions are
quite apparent when the face is right-side up, but much less appar-
ent when the face is upside-down. This effect, called the Thatcher
effect, seems to show something important about the phenomenol-
ogy of a unitized object. Speciﬁcally, what it is like to experience
the upside-down distorted face is not simply what it is like to
experience the right-side up distorted face plus inversion. Rather,
there is something that it is like to experience, say, a distorted
nose and lips in a unitized face, and that is different from what
it is like to experience a distorted nose and lips in a non-unitized
face.
APPLYING UNITIZATION TO MULTIMODAL CASES
My claim is that we unitize things, sometimes unimodally, as in
the case of faces, birds, grids of lines, random wire structures, arti-
ﬁcial blobs, and ﬁngerprints. But sometimes unitization occurs
multimodally as well. As Goldstone writes, “Neural mechanisms
for developing conﬁgural units with experience are located in the
superior colliculus and inferior temporal regions. Cells in the supe-
rior colliculus of several species receive inputs from many sensory
modalities (e.g. visual, auditory, and somatosensory), and differ-
ences in their activities reﬂect learned associations across these
modalities” (Goldstone, 1998). So, unitization occurs in part in
the superior colliculus, a place that in cats and macaque mon-
keys receives multisensory inputs (see Stein and Wallace, 1996,
p. 290).
Reconsider the difference between case one and case two of the
cymbal example. In case one, you see the jolt of the cymbal, hear
the clang, and are aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the
same event. In case two, you see the jolt and hear the clang, but
are not aware that they are part of the same event. My claim is that
in case one, the jolt and the clang are unitized in the same event,
while in case two they are not. Interestingly enough, one reason
why case two might occur in the ﬁrst place is if you have never
seen a cymbal before, and so you have not built the association
between what a cymbal looks like when it has been struck and
what it sounds like.
This gives us a substantive reply to O’Callaghan’s main argu-
ment for intermodal feature binding awareness. O’Callaghan
argues for intermodal feature binding awareness by distinguishing
between intermodal cases (1) and (2):
(1) Perceiving a thing’s being both F and G (where F and
G are features that are perceived through different sense
modalities).
(2) Perceiving a thing’s being F and a thing’s being G.
His idea is that (1) involves intermodal feature binding aware-
ness, while (2) does not. But what I am saying is that the difference
between (1) and (2) does not entail that intermodal feature binding
has occurred (as psychologists have argued). We can distinguish
between (1) and (2) phenomenally without appealing to inter-
modal feature binding. If (1) involves unitization, while (2) does
not, then the phenomenal difference between them is that in (1), F
and G are unitized in the thing, while in (2), they are not unitized
in the thing.
Putmore formally, in the case where you see the cymbal jolt and
you hear the clang, let E1[f(x)] and E2[g(y)] denote that seeing the
jolt x is a function f of vision and that the jolt is experienced as part
of event 1, while hearing the clang y is a function g of audition
and the clang is experienced as part of event 2. This is case one. Let
E1[f(x), g(y)] denote that seeing the jolt x is a function f of vision
and the jolt is experienced as part of event one, while hearing the
clang y is a function g of audition and the clang is also experienced
as part of event one. This is case two, which is distinct from case
one in that case two involves a single event while case one involves
two events5.
Unitization is applicable tomultimodal cases in otherways. Just
as there are misﬁres in unimodal unitization, there are misﬁres in
multimodal unitization cases as well. In the unimodal case, you
might see a face in a grilled cheese sandwich. Your perceptual sys-
tem is unitizing something that is not in fact a face. Now consider
the multimodal case of ventriloquism. Typically, when you see
moving lips and hear a congruent sound, the sound comes from
the lips. You have built up an association between moving lips and
the sounds that come from them. In the ventriloquist effect, you
see the dummy’s lips move, and you hear a congruent sound. Your
perceptual system unitizes the dummy’s lips and the sound. Yet,
this unitization is a misﬁre. The sound is not in fact coming from
the dummy’s lips.
In many cases, unitization enables more efﬁcient processing.
Instead of having to see the jolt of the cymbal, hear the clang,
and judge that they are both associated with the same object, the
unitization process efﬁciently does this for you. It would take a
longer time to have to see the jolt, hear the clang, and judge
that they are part of the same object. Unitization is a way of
embedding that task into our quick perceptual system. We get
the same information—that the jolt and the clang are part of the
same event—without having to make time-consuming inferences
to get there. This frees up cognition to make other, more sophisti-
cated, inferences. To draw an analogy, an elite tennis player might
not have to think about her footwork because that task has been
embedded into motor memory, freeing her mind to make more
sophisticated judgments about what to do in the match. As in such
5Thanks to a reviewer for the symbolism.
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cases of motor learning, unitization can free up cognition to do
more sophisticated tasks.
The units involved in unitization may have complex internal
structures. Think about the unitization of faces, for instance. The
associations involved are not just between two or so elements, but
can be quite complicated associations between various different
features of a face. Multimodal associations might be complicated
in a similar way. Theremay not just be simple associations between
two elements, but rather complicated associations between various
different multimodal features of a single object or event.
WhenPourtois et al. (2000),Vatakis and Spence (2007), Kubovy
and Schutz (2010), and Navarra et al. (2012) others assume that
intermodal feature binding occurs, their background reasoning is
perhaps something like the following. We know that intramodal
binding occurs, that is, that features detected by a single sense
modality get bound together, as when the shape and color of a cup
get bound to it. We know that multimodal perception occurs. So
we can take binding and extrapolate from the intramodal case to
apply it to multimodal perception. The overall argument that I am
making is structurally similar. We know that unitization occurs,
and we know that multimodal perception occurs. So I am taking
unitization and extrapolating from the unimodal case to apply it
to multimodal perception. But how do we know which point is
the right starting point? How do we know whether we should start
with binding or start with unitization? I now want to turn to a
few cases that I think are potentially difﬁcult for the intermodal
binding view to handle, but easy for the unitization view.
Start by considering a case of illusory lip-synching—a case
where someone appears to be lip-synching, but is actually singing.
Sometimes this might occur due to a mismatch in association
between the audio and the visual. In 2009, for instance, a Scot-
tish singer named Susan Boyle gained worldwide fame from her
appearance on the TV show “Britain’s Got Talent.6” Her perfor-
mance was captivating to many people because to them she did
not look as if she could have such an impressive singing voice.
They did not associate that sound with that look. And part of the
good that came out of her case was that people broke their pre-
vious false association. Now imagine that you are in the audience
as Susan Boyle steps on stage and sings. Plausibly, this would be
a confusing experience. At ﬁrst, you might not localize the sound
at Susan Boyle’s moving lips. In your experience, it might be a
case of illusory lip-synching. You might experience the sound as
coming from elsewhere, even though it is actually coming from
Susan Boyle.
Cases where vocal sounds are incongruous with the visual
might be most vivid with pets, and amusing videos are often made
documenting the results, showing animals that sound like human
beings or like ﬁre engine sirens. Consider one such example. Sup-
pose you are listening to your radio with your dog nearby. A song
comes on the radio that you haven’t heard before. You happen to
glance over at your dog, who appears to be moving its mouth in
synch with the vocals. Then you realize that what you thought
were the vocals are actually coming from your dog7.
6For a video of her initial performance, which has been viewed over 150 million
times, see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxPZh4AnWyk
7As an example of this, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KECwXu6qz8I
By appealing to learned associations, the singing dog case (and
others like it) makes sense—the radio’s location and the dog’s
sound get unitized. This happens because through experience,
your perceptual system associates the sound that the dog makes
with the radio. That sound is the kindof sound thatwould typically
come from a radio. When the radio’s location and the dog’s sound
get unitized, this is a misﬁre. The sound came from the dog and
not from the radio. However, the misﬁre is understandable, given
the fact that that type of sound typically comes from a radio and
not a dog. We can apply the lesson of this case more generally. Past
associations (between, say, types of sounds and types of things)
determine the speciﬁc multimodal units that we experience.
It is unclear what psychologists who advocate intermodal fea-
ture binding would say about these sorts of cases. The dog’s mouth
movement and the sound have happened at the exact same time,
and from the same spatial location, but fail to be bound. But
if binding were an automatic mechanism, wouldn’t intermodal
binding just bind the dog’s voice to the dog’s mouth?
One option for the defender of binding is to hold that bind-
ing need not be automatic, but can be modulated by cognitive
factors like whether or not the noise is the sound that a dog
can make. For example, O’Callaghan (forthcoming, ms p. 15)
quotes Vatakis and Spence (2007, p. 744), who claim that binding
need not depend just on “low-level (i.e., stimulus-driven) factors,
such as the spatial and temporal co-occurrence of the stimuli,”
but can depend on “higher level (i.e., cognitive) factors, such as
whether or not the participant assumes that the stimuli should ‘go
together’.” If Vatakis and Spence (2007) and O’Callaghan (forth-
coming) are right, then binding need not be automatic, since it
can be modulated by cognitive factors.
If binding need not be automatic, but can be modulated by
cognitive factors, then this presents a difﬁcult challenge. My
claim was that a view on which binding is automatic gets cases
like the dog case wrong, since it would predict that the dog’s
voice gets bound to the dog’s mouth, which is not what hap-
pens. Yet, if theorists defending an intermodal binding process
can just weaken the automaticity requirement, then it seems that
they can accommodate cases like the dog case into their model.
One possible response is to appeal to parsimony. Given that
it is difﬁcult empirically to pull apart the associative account
from the intermodal binding account, an appeal to the theo-
retical virtues of each view is warranted. If an associative view
can handle all putative cases of intermodal binding, but an
intermodal binding view cannot handle all cases without appeal-
ing to a learning mechanism (to deal with cases of involving
the plausibility of combination), then it seems like parsimony
supports the associative view. Of course, there may be other
theoretical virtues to take into account when examining both
views, as well as other empirical considerations, but it seems
at the very least that parsimony tells in favor of an associative
account.
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
Myclaim is that appealing to learned associations (such as the asso-
ciation between the dog’s sound and the radio’s location) makes
sense of cases like the dog case. But one might object that there
are other equally good or better ways of making sense of such
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cases. One alternative is that the singing dog case is just a straight-
forward crossmodal illusion, like the ventriloquist effect8. The
idea is that just as in the ventriloquist effect, the auditory loca-
tion of the sound gets bound to the moving lips, so too in the
singing dog case, the sound gets bound to the location of the
radio. In both cases, the experience is illusory. Just as the sound
is not coming from the ventriloquist dummy in the ventriloquist
case, so too is it not coming from the radio in the singing dog
case.
My response is as follows. In the ventriloquist effect, both bind-
ing and association are viable explanations, at least on its face. For
the associative explanation, it could be that we build an associ-
ation between the sound of a voice and the movement of lips.
On the other hand, an explanation just in terms of binding is
equally plausible. It could be that we bind sounds with congru-
ent movements together. In the singing dog case, however, only
an explanation in terms of association will sufﬁce. The associative
explanation is that we build an association between voice sounds
and radios, and so when the dog makes a voice sound, that sound
gets unitized with the radio. An explanation just in terms of bind-
ing gives the wrong prediction for the singing dog case. If we
bind sounds with congruent movements together, then the dog’s
sound should be bound to the congruent movement of the dog’s
mouth. Consider a second objection that there is another equally
good or better way of making sense of cases like the singing
dog case. According to this objection, feature binding can be
guided by categorical perception. The idea is that in the singing
dog case, and cases like it, the categories that you have (of
dog voices and radio sounds, for instance) inﬂuence what gets
bound to what. So, there is a story to be told about the
selection of features with regard to which features get bound
together. And it is natural to suppose that categorical learn-
ing might have a role to play in which features get selected
and thus bound together. Traditionally, the literature on bind-
ing has been very much concerned with sensory primitives like
colors and shapes, and there’s a question about whether higher-
level perceptual features get bound in that same way. According
to this objection, we do not need to choose between feature
binding and learned associations because they can play a role
together9.
I ﬁnd this objection to be plausible, yet currently unsubstanti-
ated. To the best of my knowledge at least, there is no empirical
evidence demonstrating the claim that categorical perception can
guide feature binding. I take it to still be a plausible hypothesis,
however, because there is some evidence that learning connec-
tions between sensory primitives can inﬂuence the binding process
(Colzato et al., 2006). But as far as I know, this same inﬂuence has
not been demonstrated for higher-level perceptual features. The
objection is right in that it remains a live option that feature bind-
ing can be guided by categorical perception. Still, if the goal of
the objection is to establish that there is another equally good or
better way of making sense of cases like the singing dog case, in
absence of empirical evidence to ground this alternative, the alter-
native is not a better explanation. There is empirical evidence,
8Thanks to Casey O’Callaghan for raising this possibility.
9Thanks to Tim Bayne for this objection.
due to studies on unitization, to ground the explanation of the
singing dog case in terms of learned association. So, barring empir-
ical evidence to ground the explanation of that case in terms of
categorical perception guiding feature binding, this explanation
is not equal or better than the explanation in terms of learned
association.
A third objection is to the idea that unitization can explain
multimodal cases. According to this objection, unitization implies
that there was something there before to unitize. But in certain
cases of multimodal perception, this seems implausible. Take the
case of ﬂavor perception. Flavor is a combination of taste, touch,
and retronasal (inward-directed) smell (see Smith, 2013). Yet, ﬂa-
vors are always just given to you as single uniﬁed perceptions.
You are never given just the parts. You don’t start by having a
retronasal smell experience, taste and touch, and thenunitize those
things10.
I think this objection points to an exception to the argument
that I am making. Flavor perception is a special case of multi-
modal perception where a unitization account does not apply.
This might seem ad hoc, but at the same time, it is well-recognized
that ﬂavor perception is a special case of multimodal perception
in general. Flavor is special, because as O’Callaghan points out,
it is a “type of feature whose instances are perceptible only mul-
timodally” (O’Callaghan, 2014, ms p. 26). That is to say, where
in the cymbal case, one can experience the jolt and the clang
either together or separately (if one were to close one’s eyes or
shut one’s hears, for instance), in the case of ﬂavor properties, they
are perceptible only through taste, touch, and retronasal smell.
Given that, it should not be surprising that ﬂavor has a special
treatment.
A fourth objection continues on the third, but focuses
on speech perception rather than ﬂavor perception. Accord-
ing to this objection, there are documented cases of infant
speech perception where an infant has a coupling without ever
being exposed to either of the coupling’s components. For
instance, before eleven months, Spanish infants can match
/ba/ and /va/ sounds with corresponding images of some-
one unambiguously saying /ba/ and /va/ (Pons et al., 2009).
Spanish itself does not make a distinction between /ba/ and
/va/. Even if an infant is not surrounded by English speak-
ers, for example, the infant before eleven months can still
match audio and visual English phonemes. But how can this
be through association when the infant herself was not sur-
rounded by English speakers? Why are infants able to match
the sounds with the images, and how can an associative account
explain it?11.
This objection presents a difﬁcult but not insurmountable chal-
lenge for the unitization view of multimodal perception. In the
study in question (Pons et al., 2009), all infants initially underwent
two 21 s trials in which they were presented with silent video clips
of a bilingual speaker of Spanish and English, repeatedly produc-
ing a /ba/ syllable on one side of the screen and a /va/ syllable
on the other side. So, while it is right to say that the Spanish
infants had not been surrounded by English speakers, they had
10I owe this objection to Barry C. Smith.
11I owe this objection to Barry C. Smith and Janet Werker.
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been exposed to English speakers. And it remains a possibility that
this exposure was sufﬁcient for matching audio and visual English
phonemes through association. This possibility is more plausible
if we allow that some pairs are more easily unitized than others,
in this case /ba/ and /va/ sounds with corresponding images of
someone unambiguously saying /ba/ and /va/.
CONCLUSION
My account sides with O’Callaghan in one respect, and against
the dominant view in psychology in another respect. With
O’Callaghan, I accept that perceptual awareness is not just
“minimally multimodal.” It is not just exhausted by perceptual
awareness in each of the sense modalities happening at the same
time. The cymbal case shows this. There is something that it is like
to be aware that the jolt of the cymbal and the clang are part of
the same event. And this is different from what it is like to just
see the jolt and hear the clang. In holding this view, I depart from
Spence and Bayne (2014), who ﬁnd it debatable that it is part of
one’s experience that the jolt and the clang are part of the same
event, rather than part of post-perceptual processing or some kind
of inference the subject makes.
According to the dominant view in psychology (including
Pourtois et al., 2000;Vatakis andSpence,2007; Kubovy andSchutz,
2010), multimodal experiences result from an intermodal feature
binding process. Against this dominant view, however, I am a skep-
tic of intermodal feature binding. This is because I think that an
associative process rather than a binding mechanism best explains
multimodal perceptions. To show this, I outlined a speciﬁc associa-
tive process in the literature onperceptual learning that can explain
multimodal perceptions: unitization. I argued, for instance, that
unitization best explains what it is like to be aware that the jolt
of the cymbal and the clang are part of the same event. The jolt
and the clang are unitized in that event. So, I am skeptical of an
explanation of this case, and cases like it, in terms of intermodal
feature binding. Such multimodal perceptions are unitized, not
bound12.
REFERENCES
Altieri, N., Pisoni, D. B., and Townsend, J. T. (2011). Some behavioral and
neurobiological constraints on theories of audiovisual speech integration: a
review, and suggestions fornew directions. Seeing Perceiving 24, 513–539. doi:
10.1163/187847611X595864
Altieri, N., and Townsend, J. T. (2011). An assessment of behavioral dynamic infor-
mationprocessing measures in audiovisual speech perception. Front. Psychol.
2:238. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00238
Bertelson, P., and de Gelder, B. (2004). “The psychology of multimodal perception,”
in Crossmodal Space and Crossmodal Attention, eds C. Spence and J. Driver (New
York: Oxford University Press), 141–177.
Bushara, K. O., Hanakawa, T., Immisch, I., Toma, K., Kansaku, K., and Hallett, M.
(2003). Neural correlates of cross-modal binding. Nat. Neurosci. 6, 190–195. doi:
10.1038/nn993
Colzato, L. S., Raffone, A., and Hommel, B. (2006). What do we learn from binding
features? Evidence formultilevel feature integration. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 32, 705–716. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.32.3.705
12Thanks to Casey O’Callaghan, Tim Bayne, Barry C. Smith, Diana Raffman,
Ophelia Deroy, Mohan Matthen, Peter Baumann, Janet Werker, Matthew Fulk-
erson, Adrienne Prettyman, Zoe Jenkin, Aaron Henry, an anonymous reviewer, and
to the audience at the 2014 workshop on multisensory integration at the University
of Toronto.
Connolly, K. (2013). How to test Molyneux’s question empirically. Iperception 4,
508–510. doi: 10.1068/i0623jc
Connolly, K. (2014). “Making sense of multiple senses,” in Consciousness Inside and
Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, ed. R. Brown
(Dordrecht: Springer), 351–364.
Diamond, R., and Carey, S. (1986). Why faces are and are not special: an effect of
expertise. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 115, 107–117. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.115.2.107
Fowler, C. A. (2004). “Speech as a supramodal or amodal phenomenon,” in The
Handbook of Multisensory Processes, eds G. A. Calvert, C. Spence, and B. E. Stein
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 189–201.
Gauthier, I., and Tarr, M. J. (1997). Becoming a “greeble” expert: exploring
mechanisms forface recognition. Vision Res. 37, 1673–1682. doi: 10.1016/S0042-
6989(96)00286-6
Gibson, E. J. (1963). Perceptual learning. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 14, 29–56. doi:
10.1146/annurev.ps.14.020163.000333
Gibson, J. J. (1950). The Perception of the Visual World. Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin.
Gibson, J. J. (1972). “A theory of direct visual perception,” in The Psychology of
Knowing, eds J. R. Royce and W. W. Rozeboom (New York: Gordon & Breach),
215–240.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton
Mifﬂin.
Goldstone, R. L. (1998). Perceptual learning. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 49, 585–612. doi:
10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.585
Goldstone, R. L. (2010). “Forward to gauthier,” in Perceptualexpertise: Bridging Brain
andBehavior, edsM.Tarr andD.Bub (OxfordNewYork:OxfordUniversity Press).
Goldstone, R. L., and Byrge, L. A. (2014). “Perceptual learning,” inTheOxfordHand-
book of the Philosophy of Perception, ed. M. Matthen (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
Held, R., Ostrovsky, Y., de Gelder, B., Gandhi, T., Ganesh, S., Mathur, U., et al.
(2011). The newly sighted fail to match seen shape with felt. Nat. Neurosci. 14,
551–553. doi: 10.1038/nn.2795
James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology. New York: Holt. doi: 10.1037/11059-000
Kubovy, M., and Schutz, M. (2010). Audio-visual objects. Rev. Philos. Psychol. 1,
41–61. doi: 10.1007/s13164-009-0004-5
Leibniz, G. W. (1765/1982). “Perception,” in New Essays on Human Understanding,
trans. eds P. Remnant and J. Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (1690/1975). “Perception,” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Book II, ed. P. H. Nidditch (NewYork: Oxford University Press).
Navarra, J., Yeung, H. H., Werker, J. F., and Soto-Faraco, S. (2012).
“Multisensory interactions inspeech perception,” in The New Handbook of
MultisensoryProcessing, ed. B. E. Stein, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
435–452.
O’Callaghan, C. (2014). “Not all perceptual experience is modality speciﬁc,” in
Perception and Its Modalities, eds D. Stokes, S. Biggs, and M. Matthen, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
O’Callaghan, C. (forthcoming). “Intermodal binding awareness,” in Sensory Inte-
gration and the Unity of Consciousness, eds D. Bennett and C. Hill (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press).
Pons, F., Lewkowicz, D. J., Soto-Faraco, S., and Sebastián-Gallés, N. (2009). Narrow-
ing oﬁntersensory speech perception in infancy. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.106,
10598–10602. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0904134106
Pourtois, G., de Gelder, B., Vroomen, J., Rossion, B., and Crommelinck, M. (2000).
The time-course of intermodal binding between seeing, and hearing affective
information. Neuroreport 11, 1329–1333. doi: 10.1097/00001756-200004270-
00036
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schwenkler, J. (2012). On the matching of seen and felt shapes by newly sighted
subjects. Iperception 3, 186–188. doi: 10.1068/i0525ic
Schwenkler, J. (2013). Do things look the way they feel? Analysis 73, 86–96. doi:
10.1093/analys/ans137
Shiffrin, R. M., and Lightfoot, N. (1997). Perceptual learning of alphanumeric-like
characters. Psychol. Learn.Motiv. 36, 45–81. doi: 10.1016/S0079-7421(08)60281-9
Smith, B. C. (2013). “Taste, philosophical perspectives,” in Encyclopedia of the Mind.
Thousand Oaks, ed. H. E. Pashler (California: SAGE Publications, Inc.).
Smith, L., and Yu, C. (2007). “Infants rapidly learn words from noisy data via cross-
situational statistics,” in Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 27.
Smith, L., and Yu, C. (2008). Infants rapidly learn word-referent
mappings via cross-situationalstatistics. Cognition 106, 1558–1568. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.010
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1095 | 9
Connolly Multisensory perception and associative learning
Spence, C. (2007). Audiovisual multisensory integration. Acoust. Sci. Technol. 28,
61–70. doi: 10.1250/ast.28.61
Spence, C., and Bayne, T. (2014). “Is consciousness multisensory?” in Perception
and its Modalities, eds S. Biggs, D. Stokes, and M. Matthen (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
Spence, C., and Driver, J. (ed.). (2004). Crossmodal Space and Crossmodal Atten-
tion. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524861.
001.0001
Stein, B. E. (2012). The New Handbook of Multisensory Processing. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Stein, B. E., and Wallace, M. T. (1996). Comparisons of cross-modality integration
in midbrain andcortex. Prog. Brain Res. 112, 289–299. doi: 10.1016/S0079-
6123(08)63336-1
Townsend, J. T., and Nozawa, G. (1995). Spatio-temporal properties of elementary
perception: an investigation of parallel, serial, and coactive theories. J. Math.
Psychol. 39, 321–359. doi: 10.1006/jmps.1995.1033
Townsend, J. T., and Wenger, M. J. (2004). A theory of interactive parallel process-
ing: newcapacity measures and predictions for a response time inequality series.
Psychol. Rev. 111, 1003–1035. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.1003
Vatakis, A., and Spence, C. (2007). Crossmodal binding: evaluating the “unity
assumption”using audiovisual speech stimuli. Percept. Psychophys. 69, 744–756.
doi: 10.3758/BF03193776
Wallace, M. T. (2004). The development of multisensory processes. Cogn. Proc. 5,
69–83. doi: 10.1007/s10339-004-0017-z
Yu, C., and Smith, L. B. (2006). “Statistical cross-situational learning to build word-
to-worldmappings,” in Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum).
Yu, C., and Smith, L. (2007). Rapid word learning under uncertainty via
cross-situational statistics. Psychol. Sci. 18, 414–420. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01915.x
Yu, C., and Smith, L. B. (2011). What you learn is what you see: using eye move-
ments to studyinfant cross-situational word learning. Dev. Sci. 14, 165–180. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00958.x
Yu, C., and Smith, L. B. (2012). Modeling cross-situational word–referent
learning: priorquestions. Psychol. Rev. 119, 21–39. doi: 10.1037/a00
26182
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 19 July 2014; accepted: 10 September 2014; published online: 26 September
2014.
Citation: Connolly K (2014)Multisensory perception as an associative learning process.
Front. Psychol. 5:1095. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01095
This article was submitted to Consciousness Research, a section of the journal Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Connolly. This is an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the orig-
inal author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1095 | 10
